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THE JERUSALEM EMBASSY ACT OF 1995
Geoffrey R. Watson *
Congress has voted to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv
to Jerusalem. On October 24, 1995-the day of the Conference on Jeru-
salem here at the Columbus School of Law of The Catholic University of
America-Congress passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995.1 The
President took no action on the Act, allowing it to enter into force on
November 8, 1995.2 The Act states that a United States Embassy to
Israel should be established in Jerusalem by May 31, 1999, and it provides
for a fifty percent cut in the State Department's building budget if the
Embassy is not opened by that time.' The Act permits the President to
waive the budget cut for successive six-month periods if the President
determines it is necessary to protect the "national security interests of the
United States."'
In these pages and elsewhere, several contributors to this symposium
have addressed the policy questions raised by the Act.5 I will focus on
the Act's interpretation.
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic Uni-
versity of America, 1995-present; Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of
Law, 1991-95; Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, 1989-91. 1 would like to thank Bob Destro
and Alice Kaswan for their helpful comments.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-45, 109 Stat. 398 (1995). See 141 CONG. REC. S15535 (daily ed.
Oct. 24, 1995) (Senate vote); 141 CONo. REC. H10691 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (House
vote).
2. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (describing the Administration's rea-
sons for neither signing nor vetoing the Act). The Act became law ten days after the
President received it, not counting Sundays. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I., § 7, cl. 2.
3. § 3, 109 Stat. at 399.
4. § 7(a), 109 Stat. at 400. The Act also requires the Secretary of State to report
regularly on progress toward the establishment of an embassy in Jerusalem. See § 5, 109
Stat. at 399-400 (requiring a report to Congress within 30 days of enactment); § 6, 109 Stat.
at 400 (requiring semiannual reports).
5. See, e.g., Marshall J. Breger, Jerusalem Gambit, NAT'L REv., Oct. 23, 1995, at 41,
44 (arguing that the "symbolic question of where the embassy lies" may "obscure, or in-
deed work against," the goal of a united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty); Samuel W.
Lewis, Reflections on the Future of Jerusalem, 45 CAm. U. L. REv. 695, 697 (1995) ("[T]he
passage of this law, while offensive to many Arabs, created no real turbulence in the ongo-
ing peace process with Syria and the Palestinians."); cf. Marshall J. Breger, Jerusalem, Now
and Then: The New Battle for Jerusalem, MIDDLE EAST Q., Dec. 1994, at 23, 34 (arguing
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I.
The United States recognized Israel immediately upon its indepen-
dence in 1948, and shortly thereafter the United States opened its Em-
bassy in Tel Aviv, then the seat of the Israeli government. 6 At that time,
Israel had control of West Jerusalem, while Jordan had control of East
Jerusalem. After the 1967 war, East Jerusalem came under Israeli con-
trol, as did the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. Since then the
United States, like most states, has taken the position that negotiations
should determine the final status of Jerusalem.7 Moreover, since 1967
every U.S. President, both Republican and Democrat, has asserted that
the United States Embassy should remain in Tel Aviv pending the out-
come of such negotiations.8 These administrations have argued that mov-
ing the Embassy to Jerusalem would antagonize needlessly the Arab
states and the Palestinians, who argue that al-Quds is their capital.9
that Washington should "jettison[] its outdated position that the sovereignty of Jerusalem
is on the negotiating table"). Professor Breger has also addressed the constitutionality of
S. 770, the forerunner to the Jerusalem Embassy Act. See Breger, Jerusalem Gambit,
supra, at 43 (arguing that S. 770 was unconstitutional).
6. See Testimony of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, Feb. 23, 1984 [hereinafter Testimony
of Lawrence S. Eagleburger], excerpted in MARIAN NASH LEICH, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 10120, 1 CUMULATIVE DIGEST OF UNITED
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-1988, at 483 (1993) [hereinafter 1 U.S.
DIGEST 1981-1988] (noting that the United States was the first country to recognize Israel).
7. See, e.g., U.S. Middle East Policy: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on For. Rel., 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990) (statement of Secretary Vance) ("[T]he final status of the city must
be settled in the context of negotiations for a final peace."), excerpted in MARIAN NASH
LEICH, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 9610, DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1980, at 103 (1986); 1 U.S. Digest
1981-1988, supra note 6, at 478 ("Following the Arab-Israeli 'Six-Day War' of June 1967,
the position of the United States was and continues to the present time to be that the final
status of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiations .... "); ELEANOR C. MC-
DOWELL, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PUB. No. 8908, DI-
GEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1976, at 634 (1977) (restating
the U.S. view that "unilateral attempts to predetermine [Jerusalem's] future have no
standing").
8. See, e.g., 1 U.S. DIGEST 1981-1988, supra note 6, at 479 ("Like its predecessors, the
administration of President Ronald Reagan held ... that the U.S. Embassy should remain
in Tel Aviv pending a negotiated resolution of Jerusalem's status."); Letter from Warren
Christopher, Secretary of State, to Robert Dole, Senate Majority Leader (June 20, 1995),
reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S15469 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (arguing against moving the
Embassy); see also Testimony of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, supra note 6, excerpted in 1
U.S. DIGEST 1981-1988, supra note 6, at 484-85 (arguing against proposals to move the
United States Embassy to Jerusalem).
9. See Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex III, Agenda Item 37, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/43/827:S/20278 (1988);
see also John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 765,780 (1996) ("Pal-
estine has a valid claim to Jerusalem.").
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Congress, on the other hand, has repeatedly expressed its view that the
United States Embassy to Israel should be moved from Tel Aviv to Jeru-
salem.10 Congressional supporters of the move argue that Jerusalem is
the capital of Israel, and that the U.S.'s refusal to maintain an embassy in
Jerusalem undermines America's support for Israel. They point out that
Israel is one of the few countries in the world in which the United States
does not maintain its embassy in the host state's capital." They dismiss
10. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 305(A), 102 Stat. 2186, 2208 (1988) (providing that
each new diplomatic facility in Israel, Jerusalem, or the West Bank must "equally pre-
serve[ ] the ability of the United States to locate its Ambassador or its Consul General at
that site, consistent with United States policy"). As to State Department implementation
of this law. see 1 U.S. DIGEST 1981-1988, supra note 6, at 485-86. Examples of bills calling
on the President to move the Embassy include H.R. Con. Res. 281, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(Aug. 11, 1994); S. 2508, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 13, 1988); H.R. Con. Res. 78, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 6, 1985).
11. Supporters of the Act sometimes say there are no other cases in which a United
States Embassy is not located in the host's capital city. See, e.g., Letter from 93 United
States Senators to Warren Christopher, Secretary of State (Mar. 20, 1995), reprinted in 141
CONG. REC. S15476 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) ("Israel is the only nation in which our em-
bassy is not located in the functioning capital."). In fact, there are several other cases in
which the United States maintains an embassy in a place other than the capital city. The
United States Embassy to Belize is in Belize City, not in the capital city of Belmopan. The
American Embassy to Benin is in Cotonou, not the capital city of Porto-Novo. The United
States Embassy to Cote d'Ivoire is in Abidjan, not the capital, Yamoussoukro. The United
States Embassy to Micronesia is in Kolonia, not the capital Palikir. Compare United States
Department of State, Country List Organized by Geographic Area/Bureau (avail. at go-
pher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OF-1 %3A6979%3Algeolist.txt) (listing embassy locations)
with United States Department of State, Office of the Geographer, Independent States in
the World (avail. at gopher://dosfan.lib.uic.edu:70/OFl%3A7916%3A96/02/16%20 In-
dependent) (listing capitals). See generally 1 COurrRIEs OF THE WORLD 157 (Brian
Rajewski ed., 1996) (providing information on capitals of Belize and Benin); id. at 163
(Cote d'Ivoire); id. at 181 (Micronesia).
In many (perhaps most) cases, the situation appears to be temporary. For example, Ni-
geria moved its capital recently to Abuja, in the north part of that country, but the United
States Embassy to Nigeria is still in Lagos. A branch office of the American Embassy has
been opened in the new capital. See id. at 183-84.
In a few cases, location of an embassy is a matter of choosing between different seats of
government, so it is not possible to locate the embassy in one "capital" city. For example,
the United States maintains its Embassy to Bolivia in La Paz, the executive capital, not in
Sucre, the legislative and judicial capital. See id. at 157. Similarly, the United States Em-
bassy to the Netherlands is in the Hague, the seat of government, rather than Amsterdam.
See id. at 182. Furthermore, the United States Embassy to South Africa shuttles between
Pretoria and Cape Town, because the South African government itself changes seats de-
pending on the season. See id. at 191.
Of course, there are a number of countries in which the United States maintains no
embassy at all, even though it does maintain diplomatic relations with them. Indeed, even
the lack of diplomatic relations does not necessarily imply nonrecognition. See RESTATE-
mrN (THIRD) OF THE FoRIIN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. d
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (stating that "one government may recognize another yet re-
frain from assuming diplomatic relations with it") (citing U.S.-Cuba relations).
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suggestions that moving the Embassy would damage the peace process,
arguing that no one can realistically expect Israel to move its capital away
from Jerusalem, and that pretending otherwise unnecessarily raises Pales-
tinian hopes to the contrary. 12 In any event, they add, the Embassy can
be located in West Jerusalem, where Israel's claim to sovereignty is less
controversial. 13 The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, then, is just the lat-
est shot in a longstanding battle between the legislative and the executive
branches over the location of the United States Embassy to Israel.
The Act's immediate precursor was S. 770, which Senator Kyl intro-
duced in May, 1995.1' That bill was different from the final Act in two
ways: it mandated the commencement of construction of a Jerusalem Em-
bassy in 1996, and it contained no provision for a presidential waiver of
the bill's mandate. The Clinton Administration opposed the bill on pol-
icy and constitutional grounds.15 S. 770 had sixty-two co-sponsors in the
Senate, not quite enough to override a presidential veto. Accordingly,
Senator Dole introduced a new bill, S. 1322, that eliminated the require-
ment that construction begin in 1996.16 Thereafter, Dole and his co-spon-
sors reluctantly added the presidential waiver provision in order to allay
concerns about the bill's constitutionality, and to preserve some presiden-
tial flexibility as a policy matter. 7 In this form, overwhelming majorities
in both Houses adopted the bill.18
The State Department sources cited above can also be found through its Web site, http://
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/index.html.
12. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S15476 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (remarks of Sen.
D'Amato) ("Further delay in moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem will only embolden
the Palestinians who believe that they have a justified claim to the city.").
13. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S15483 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Boxer)
(asserting that "our Embassy will be located within the pre-1967 West Jerusalem border,
not in the more controversial eastern section").
14. S. 770, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 10, 1995).
15. See Letter from Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, to Robert Dole, Senate
Majority Leader (June 20, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S15469 (daily ed. Oct. 23,
1995) (arguing against S. 770 on policy and constitutional grounds); see also Memorandum
from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
President (May 16, 1995) [hereinafter OLC Memorandum], reprinted in 141 CONG. REC.
S15468 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (arguing that the bill is unconstitutional).
16. See 141 CONG. REc. S15166 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995) (introduction of S. 1322); id.
S15176-79 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole) (comparing S. 1322 to S. 770).
17. See 141 CONG. REc. S15467-68 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Fein-
stein) (describing negotiations on the bill); 141 CONG. REc. S15521 (daily ed. Oct. 24,1995)
(remarks of Sen. Feinstein) (describing efforts to reach a compromise).
18. See 141 CONG. REC. S15535 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (93-5 in the Senate, with one
not voting); 141 CONG. REc. H10691 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (374-37 in the House, with 5
voting "present" and 17 not voting).
The sponsors of the bill were also anxious to speed its passage through Congress before
Prime Minister Rabin arrived at the Capitol Rotunda for a ceremony honoring the 3,000-
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That same day the White House announced that the President would
neither sign nor veto the bill, allowing it to go into effect by default.19
Press Secretary Mike McCurry 'eleased a statement reiterating the Presi-
dent's opposition to the legislation. The statement acknowledged the
near-unanimous vote in the Congress and concluded that a veto "would
only prolong a divisive debate and risk further damage to the peace pro-
cess."2 It added:
The President will not, however, sign this legislation. To do so
would be inconsistent with his pledge to take no action which
would undermine a peace process that shows so much promise
of creating a better future for Israel and its neighbors. There-
fore, when the bills passed this week become law, the President
will use their waiver provisions to prevent the legislation from
adversely affecting the Middle East peace process.2 '
Unlike some of the Administration's earlier statements on the bill, Mc-
Curry's statement did not charge directly that the Act was
unconstitutional.
Since then the Clinton Administration has filed two reports with Con-
gress, as the Act requires. 22 The first report, dated December 8, 1995, set
forth various options for the establishment of an embassy, ranging from
constructing a new building to leasing an existing one.23 The second re-
port, dated March 1, 1996, elaborated on possible time-lines for opening
an embassy. But it added that the President "would take no action which
would undermine the peace process. Thus, as we consider how best to
respond to the provisions of the Act, we should do so in a way that avoids
year anniversary of Jerusalem. See 141 CONG. REc. H10685 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (re-
marks of Rep. Gephardt) (stating "I can't think of a better anniversary gift" than to ac-
knowledge Jerusalem as Israel's capital); id. H10687 (remarks of Rep. Engel) (citing the
anniversary). Several House members complained that no hearings had been held on the
bill. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H10682 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Hamil-
ton); id. H10687 (remarks of Rep. Engel) (supporting the bill but complaining about the
absence of hearings or a markup session).
19. See Statement by the Press Secretary on Israeli Embassy Bill, 1995 WL 622772
(WHITE HoUSE), Oct. 24, 1995. The Constitution provides that when the Congress is in
session, a bill becomes law if it is not acted on by the President within ten days of its
presentation to the President. See U.S. CONST. art. I., § 7, cl. 2.
20. Statement of the Press Secretary, supra note 19, at *1.
21. Id.
22. See Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 5, 109 Stat. 398, 399-400 (1995) (requiring a report
within 30 days of enactment); id. § 6, 109 Stat. at 400 (requiring semiannual reports).
23. See Report Pursuant to Section 5 of Public Law 104-45, attached to Letter from
Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Newt Gingrich, Speaker
of the House (Dec. 8, 1995).
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damage to the peace process., 24 Neither report made any explicit refer-
ence to the Act's constitutionality.
II.
The waiver authority in the Act raises two questions of interpretation.
First, is there any limit to the number of successive waivers a President
may invoke? A few congressional proponents of the Act have suggested
that some such limit exists.21 Second, how broad is the President's discre-
tion to invoke the waiver? The Administration's recent statements, par-
ticularly McCurry's statement, imply that the President has broad
discretion to invoke the waiver. During floor debate on the bill, however,
many supporters of the legislation suggested otherwise. 26 These interpre-
tive questions are, of course, related to the question of the Act's constitu-
tionality. Where possible, statutes are construed consistently with the
Constitution.27 But interpretation of the Act begins with its text.
The first interpretive question, relating to successive waivers, is an-
swered readily by the plain language of the waiver provision. Section
7(a)(2) provides for additional suspensions "at the end of any period"
during which a suspension is already in effect.28 This provision must
mean that the President can issue an indefinite string of six-month waiv-
ers. It states quite plainly that the President may tack a new waiver pe-
riod at the end of "any" existing period in which a waiver is in effect.
In a colloquy on the Senate floor, Senators Dole and Kyl tried to sug-
gest otherwise. Senator Kyl asked whether the intent of the drafters was
to give the President the "right to invoke the waiver in perpetuity?, 29
Senator Dole replied: "The waiver authority should not be interpreted to
mean that the President may infinitely push off the establishment of the
American Embassy in Jerusalem."3 But Dole undermined his own posi-
24. See Report Pursuant to Section 6 of Public Law 104-45, at 4, attached to Letter
from Wendy R. Sherman, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House (Mar. 1, 1996).
25. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
27. See United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909) (asserting
that courts have a "duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from consti-
tutional infirmity").
28. Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 7(a)(2), 109 Stat. 398, 400 (1995).
29. 141 CONG. REC. S15532 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Kyl).
30. Id. (remarks of Sen. Dole). Earlier, when speculating about the possibility of ad-
*ding waiver language to the bill, Senator Kyl also stressed that it would be a "temporary
waiver only." 141 CONG. REC. S15470 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Kyl).
Senator Kyl stated: "We are not talking about the ability of the President to simply con-
tinue year after year after year" to waive the Act. Id.; see also 141 CONG. REc. H10681
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Gilman) ("Congress does not intend for the
[Vol. 45:837
Jerusalem Embassy Act
tion by adding: "If a waiver were to be repeatedly and routinely exercised
by a President, I would expect Congress to act by removing the waiver
authority."'" This statement implies that the Act does not prevent the
President from waiving the Act in perpetuity-that a further act of Con-
gress would be required to prevent the President from doing so. In any
event, insofar as the colloquy contradicts the plain language of the stat-
ute, the latter must prevail. The President can link together an infinite
series of waivers.
The second interpretive question is more difficult. Does the Act per-
mit the President to waive its provisions for any reason, or is presidential
discretion constrained? Furthermore, if it is constrained, to what extent?
Section 7(a) of the Act provides that the President "may suspend" the
fifty percent cut in the State Department's building budget for a period of
six months if "necessary to protect the national security interests of the
United States."32 By its terms, of course, the provision does constrain the
President: the President must base the waiver on America's "national se-
curity interests." Still, the Administration's statements about the Act im-
ply that the President will be free to invoke the waiver because potential
damage to the peace process always threatens United States national se-
curity interests. If it follows the practice of prior administrations, the
Clinton Administration will take the position that it has unfettered dis-
cretion to determine whether moving the Embassy jeopardizes American
national security interests.
Again, Senators Dole and Kyl sought to make legislative history to nar-
row the President's discretion. Senator Dole opined that the President
cannot invoke the waiver "simply because he thinks it would be better
not to move our Embassy to Jerusalem or simply because he thinks it
would be better to move it at a later time."'33 Dole added that the phrase
"national security interests" is "much narrower" than the term "national
interest." "No President should or could make a decision to exercise this
waiver lightly." 34 Other legislators echoed the view that the waiver au-
thority should be construed narrowly.35 Conversely, at least one or two
President to utilize this waiver indefinitely .... "); cf 141 CONG. REC. H10685 (daily ed.
Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Rep. Saxton) (asserting that the waiver authority "says to the
President, if you need a temporary delay, we grant a waiver") (emphasis added).
31. 141 CONG. Rac. S15532 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
32. § 7(a)(1), 109 Stat. at 400.
33. 141 CONG. REC. S15531 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
34. Id. It remains to be seen how Senator Dole will interpret the Act if he becomes
President Dole.
35. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. S15521 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Fein-
stein) (asserting that the "national security interests" test is a "tough but fair standard" and
suggesting that it might be met, "if a successful conclusion to the Middle East peace process
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legislators seemed to believe that the waiver provision permits the Presi-
dent to waive the Act's provisions in a fairly free manner.36
The use of the term "national security interests" in other statutes may
support the conclusion that the President has broad discretion to inter-
pret the waiver provisions of the Jerusalem Embassy Act. Over the
years, the executive branch has abided grudgingly by a whole panoply of
statutes requiring certain actions unless the President certifies that the
action is not in the country's "vital national interests" or "national secur-
ity interests., 37 The statutes regulating international narcotics trafficking,
for example, require the President to certify that certain foreign states are
cooperating on the war on drugs as a condition of their continued receipt
of foreign aid, but the law permits the President to permit continued aid
to a decertified country if the President determines it to be in the coun-
try's "vital national interests., 38 In practice, the President has enjoyed
discretion to determine those "vital national interests"-arguably a
higher standard than the "national security interests" the President must
cite to waive the Jerusalem Embassy Act.39 Similarly, statutes on human
could be imperiled by the implementation of this act"); id. S15523 (remarks of Sen. Robb)
(asserting that a waiver is permissible if the act would have "dire consequences on the
peace process"); id. S15532 (remarks of Sen. Lautenberg) (asserting that the waiver provi-
sion gives an administration a "limited amount of flexibility").
Even some opponents of the legislation thought the waiver authority restricted the Presi-
dent's discretion to waive the Act. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H10686 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
1995) (remarks of Rep. Rahall) (asserting that the waiver authority "does not necessarily
mean that the President may consider a breakdown of ongoing peace talks in the Middle
East, or a breakdown of relations between Israel and the PLO, as being 'in the national
security interests' "); cf id. at S15526 (remarks of Sen. Chafee) (maintaining "there is still
no guarantee that the Embassy move could be waived if the peace process is halted").
36. See id. at S15523 (remarks of Sen. Cohen) (describing waiver provision as "broad
waiver authority"); cf id. at S15534 (remarks of Sen. Daschle) ("Definitely, the whole
concept of a peace process is in our national security interest."); id. (asserting that the
waiver provision "will provide the President the flexibility to ensure that the peace process
can move forward").
37. See generally Jeffrey A. Meyer, Comment, Congressional Control of Foreign
Assistance, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 69 (1988) (surveying and critiquing certification laws).
38. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 2005(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 3207,
3207-62.
39. Cf. Meyer, supra note 37, at 74 (describing past practice of Presidents in interpret-
ing waiver provisions). According to Meyer,
Almost all of the early restrictions on foreign assistance allowed the President
an unlimited power of waiver. Typically, the President could make a finding that
a restriction did not serve "national security interests" and waive it without in-
forming Congress or explaining his rationale. Where Congress did not allow a
waiver, the President could still evade the effect of congressional restrictions be-
cause of their definitional vagueness. The President was not required to consult





rights supposedly condition foreign assistance on human rights considera-
tions, subject to presidential waivers.4 ° Again, Presidents have asserted
broad discretion to interpret these statutes. Presidents have been reluc-
tant to find, for example, that any state engaged in a "consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights" 41-a stat-
utory finding that would curtail foreign assistance to the state in ques-
tion-even though many states would seem to qualify.42 If past practice
is any guide, the President will enjoy discretion to interpret whether mov-
ing the United States Embassy to Jerusalem implicates "national security
interests."
In principle, the scope of the waiver authority also should be construed
in light of international law. Statutes are presumed to be consistent with
treaty obligations unless they "clearly and unequivocally" evince intent to
the contrary.43 In this case, however, international law probably does not
demand any particular reading for at least two reasons. First, interna-
tional law does not regulate which branch of government dictates the
placement of its embassies. It speaks only of mutual consent of the
"states" involved.44 Second, whatever the status of Jerusalem under in-
ternational law, the Embassy Act evinces a "clear and unequivocal" in-
tent to recognize Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel and to move
the United States Embassy there. It appears, then, that international law
does not mandate a broad or narrow reading of the Act's waiver
provision.
More recent waiver provisions have sought to limit the President's discretion by impos-
ing numerical standards, reporting and consulting requirements, shortened authorization
periods, and even "shadow fact-finding." See id. at 83-85. But the President still has the
"executive" authority to interpret the law. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986)
("[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very
essence of 'execution' of the law.").
40. Cf. Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, § 502B, 88 Stat. 1795, 1815 (codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1994)) (allowing such assistance if the President certifies that "ex-
traordinary circumstances" exist); 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1994) (allowing an administration
to waive a ban on aid to human rights violators if it will "directly benefit the needy people
in such country").
41. § 502B, 88 Stat. at 1815 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (1994)).
42. See David Carleton & Michael Stohl, The Foreign Policy of Human Rights: Rheto-
ric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan, 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 205, 211-27 (1985)
(finding little correlation between the provision of U.S. foreign assistance and acceptable
human rights practices); Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on
Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 256-74 (1982) (critiquing the executive
branch's reluctance to find that states qualify under § 502B).
43. See United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
44. Cf. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 2, 23 U.S.T.
3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 ("The establishment of diplomatic relations between States, and of
permanent diplomatic missions, takes place by mutual consent.").
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The United States Constitution, however, probably does require a
broad reading of the waiver provision. Statutes must be construed to
avoid constitutional infirmity, and a narrow construction of the waiver
provision could constrain the President's powers in foreign affairs imper-
missibly. The Constitution vests the President with "executive power,"
the power to receive ambassadors, and, subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate, the powers to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors.45
It may be going too far to suggest, as the Justice Department has, that the
President has the "exclusive" authority to conduct the Nation's diplo-
matic relations with other states.46 The President's power to appoint am-
bassadors, for example, is shared, not exclusive, and that power certainly
affects the "conduct" of diplomatic relations. But it is true, as Justice
asserts, that the President holds the power to recognize foreign states and
governments.47 That power is exclusive.48 It extends not just to states
45. U.S. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1-3.
46. See OLC Memorandum, supra note 15, reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S15468 (daily
ed. Oct. 23, 1995).
47. See id. (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964))
(stating that the President has the power of recognition); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11,
§ 204 (maintaining that the President has "exclusive authority to recognize or not to recog-
nize a foreign state or government"); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229
(1942) (stating that the President has exclusive power to recognize states and to determine
policy governing such recognition); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
The Jerusalem Embassy Act acknowledged the President's recognition power implicitly by
stating that Jerusalem "should" (not "shall") be recognized as the capital of Israel. Pub. L..
No. 104-45, § 3(a)(2), 109 Stat. 398, 399,(1995).
It is true that Alexander Hamilton suggested that the President's power to "receive"
ambassadors is "more a matter of dignity than of authority" and "a circumstance which will
be without consequence." THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (quoted in
Malvina Halberstam, Can Congress Move an Embassy?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, re-
printed in 141 CONG. REC. S15177 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995)). But Hamilton later main-
tained the contrary in the Pacificus-Helvidius debate, in which Hamilton defended
President Washington's unilateral power to proclaim neutrality. See Raoul Berger, The
Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972) (cited in LAU-
RENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 220 n.7 (2d ed. 1988)). Historically,
moreover, "presidents have made decisions on recognition, starting with George Washing-
ton's recognition of the French Republic." Halberstam, supra, reprinted in 141 CONG.
REC. S15177, supra.
48. E.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 410 ("Political recognition is exclusively a function of
the Executive.") (emphasis added); RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 204 (stating that the
President's recognition authority is "exclusive"); BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIM-
BLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 462 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that the President's recognition
authority is "exclusive"); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 93
(1972) ("[Congress] cannot itself (or effectively direct the President to) recognize foreign
states or governments, or establish or regulate or break relations with them."); TRIBE,
supra note 47, at 220 n.7 ("It is generally understood that the President has the substantive
power to determine the recognition policies of the United States and that this power is
effectively immune from congressional regulation") (citation omitted).
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and governments, but also to claims of territorial sovereignty, such as
claims to sovereignty over disputed cities like Jerusalem.4 9 The Presi-
dent's exclusive recognition power implies that he has broad discretion to
interpret the waiver provisions of the Jerusalem Embassy Act. His recog-
nition power implies that he has broad latitude to determine whether
moving the Embassy undermines the "national security interests" of the
United States. A narrow interpretation of the waiver provision would
impermissibly interfere with the President's exclusive recognition power.
Senator Dole and others who prefer a narrower reading of the waiver
authority may acknowledge that the President has a power of recognition.
But they will argue that this power, even if exclusive, does not include an
exclusive power to decide on the location of a United States Embassy.
They will point out that the location of an embassy does not necessarily
imply recognition of that city as a state's capital." They will conclude
that moving the Embassy to Jerusalem does not usurp the President's
recognition power, because the President can always clarify that the move
does not change the United States' recognition policy-that Jerusalem's
status should be resolved through negotiations. Indeed, the United
States has done this in other circumstances. The United States main-
tained an embassy in East Berlin but made clear that the United States
did not regard East Berlin as the capital of Germany. 1 Even today the
United States maintains a few embassies in cities other than the host
state's capital city.52 In such cases the executive branch is perfectly capa-
ble of clarifying what it regards as the actual capital of the host state.
Therefore, this argument runs, the Congress can set the location of an
embassy without intruding on the President's recognition power, and the
President's waiver authority can be invoked only in "dire"
circumstances.53
But actions speak louder than words, even (or perhaps especially) in
diplomacy. Changing the location of the Embassy will inevitably create a
49. Cf. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 20, U.N. DOC. S/INF/46
(1990) (calling upon all states "not to recognize" Iraq's annexation of Kuwait).
50. See Breger, Jerusalem Gambit, supra note 5, at 42 ("[A]s Jewish groups have them-
selves often argued in regard to the embassy in Tel Aviv, the fact that a U.S. embassy is
located in a particular city does not necessarily mean that the U.S. recognizes that city as a
capital."); supra note 11 (citing examples in which the United States maintains embassies
outside the host state's capital city). Nothing in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, supra note 44, requires the Sending State to locate its embassy in the capital of
the Receiving State.
51. See Breger, Jerusalem Gambit, supra note 5, at 42.
52. See supra note 11.
53. See 141 CONG. REC. S15523 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Robb) (ar-
guing that a waiver is permissible only if moving the embassy would have "dire conse-
quences on the peace process").
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changed perception of United States' recognition policy, regardless of
presidential statements to the contrary. Indeed, international law recog-
nizes that actions can themselves amount to indirect recognition.54 And
indirect recognition is, after all, the main point of the Jerusalem Embassy
Act. Its sponsors seek to move the Embassy not because it would be
more convenient for the Ambassador and staff to work in Jerusalem,
though this might account for some support of the measure. 55 They seek
to move the Embassy to demonstrate that the United States recognizes a
united Jerusalem that is the capital of Israel.56 Senator Dole's narrow
interpretation of the waiver authority could undermine the President's
recognition policy in a region of the world where the tea leaves of recog-
nition are read very closely. As the Supreme Court has stated, the recog-
nition power "is not limited to a determination of the government to be
recognized. It includes the power to determine the policy which is to gov-
ern the question of recognition."57 Put in terms of the Act's waiver provi-
sion, the President has broad discretion to determine whether moving the
Embassy is in the "national security interests" of the United States.5 8
Supporters of the Act stress that it does not require the President to
open an embassy in Jerusalem, but instead merely creates financial incen-
tive for the President to do so.59 That is, the Act merely cuts certain State
Department appropriations if the President fails to move the Embassy; it
does not eliminate them altogether. 60 But Congress cannot use unconsti-
54. Cf. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 20, U.N. Doc. S/INF/46(1990) (calling on states to refrain from "any action or dealing that might be interpreted as
an indirect recognition" of Iraq's annexation of Kuwait).
55. See Lewis, supra note 5, at 303 (describing the Ambassador's daily trip from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem as an "inconvenience").
56. Thus the three-part statement of policy in the Act provides that Jerusalem should
remain undivided with the rights of ethnic and religious groups protected, that Jerusalem
should be recognized as the capital of Israel, and that the United States Embassy should be
established in Jerusalem by May 31, 1999. See Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 398, 399
(1995).
57. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
58. This conclusion is consistent with the practice of past Administrations. See OLC
Memorandum, supra note 15, reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S15468, S15469 (citing
examples).
59. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gerald Charnoff et al., Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trow-
bridge, to American Israel Public Affairs Committee (June 27, 1995) [hereinafter Charnoff
Memorandum], reprinted in 141 CONG. REc. S15471 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1995). "[Tjhere is
an obvious and constitutionally significant difference between an appropriations law for-
bidding the President to take action which the Constitution leaves to his discretion and a
law which merely sets out the negative financial consequences that will ensue if the Presi-
dent pursues a certain policy." Id. at S15472.
60. See § 3(b), 109 Stat. at 399.
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tutional conditions to achieve indirectly what it cannot achieve directly.61
Proponents of the Jerusalem Embassy Act rely heavily on South Dakota
v. Dole,62 in which the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute withhold-
ing five percent of highway funds from any state whose drinking age is
less than twenty-one. The Dole Court stressed, however, that the condi-
tion involved only a "relatively small percentage" of the funds in ques-
tion, and it reaffirmed warnings in earlier Court cases that a more
coercive condition-one in which "pressure turns into compulsion"-
might be unconstitutional.63 The Jerusalem Embassy Act, by contrast,
involves a fifty percent cut in funding-well past the point at which incen-
tive becomes coercion, and pressure becomes compulsion.64
In any event, the Court has since suggested that the rationale of Dole
does not extend to separation-of-powers cases.65 This suggestion makes
sense. The powers of, the federal government are not just separate; in
some cases, they are nondelegable. Unlike highway funds, these powers
cannot be bargained away. The President cannot give up the presidential
power of recognition any more than the Congress can give up the con-
gressional power of appropriations. Of course many foreign-affairs pow-
61. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73-74 (1936) (holding that where
Congress lacks power to legislate, it "may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing
and spending to purchase compliance").
62. 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see Charnoff Memorandum, supra note 59, reprinted in 141
CONG. REC. S15741, S15742 (discussing and relying on Dole).
63. Id at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
64. Supporters of the Embassy Act also rely on Oklahoma v. United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). See Charnoff Memorandum, supra note 59, re-
printed in 141 CONG. REC. S15471, S15472. In Oklahoma, the Supreme Court sustained a
statute denying a state a small percentage of its highway funds if a state employee in a
federally-funded job violated the Hatch Act. 330 U.S. at 140. But in that case the percent-
age of funds involved was probably even lower than in Dole. The statute withheld the
equivalent of two years compensation of the state employee in question-a tiny percent-
age of the two million dollars in federal highway funds the state received during the six-
month period in which the violations took place. See id. at 135. Under those circum-
stances, it is hardly surprising that the Court believed Oklahoma could (and did) resort to
the " 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion." Id. at 143-
44. Cf. also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175 (1992) (holding that a congres-
sional "incentive" to states to take title to radioactive waste "crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion").
65. See Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 271 (1991) [hereinafter MWAA] ("Our reasoning [in Dole] that,
absent coercion, a sovereign State has both the incentive and the ability to protect its own
rights and powers, and therefore may cede such rights and powers, is inapplicable to the
issue presented by this case.") (citations omitted). The decision thus also reaffirmed that
Dole itself was premised on a small incentive not amounting to "coercion."
The MWAA Court invalidated a congressional transfer of airports to states because the
transfer was conditioned on the appointment of members of Congress to an executive
role-a Review Board that had veto power over the future of the airports. Id. at 276-77.
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ers are shared. Shared powers serve democracy, perhaps at the expense
of efficiency. But exclusive powers serve democracy too. When exclusive
powers are exercised poorly, there is no doubt about whom to blame.
The President, like the Congress, is elected. If the President's recognition
policy is that bad, the President will pay for it at the polls.
III.
In sum, the waiver provisions of the Jerusalem Embassy Act should be
interpreted broadly. The Act should be read to give the President broad
discretion to determine whether moving the Embassy to Jerusalem impli-
cates "national security interests of the United States." This construction
of the Act is supported by its text and by practice under similar "national
security interest" provisions in other statutes. The constitutional separa-
tion of powers also requires such an interpretation. The President, not
the Congress, has the power of recognition, and the location of the
United States Embassy to Israel has inescapable implications for United
States recognition policy. The President, not the Congress, is entrusted
with the responsibility to determine what that policy should be.
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